Files
kubesphere/vendor/github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/topdown/tokens.go
hongming cfebd96a1f update dependencies (#6267)
Signed-off-by: hongming <coder.scala@gmail.com>
2024-11-06 10:27:06 +08:00

1247 lines
35 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2017 The OPA Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by an Apache2
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package topdown
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"math/big"
"strings"
"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/ast"
"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/internal/jwx/jwa"
"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/internal/jwx/jwk"
"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/internal/jwx/jws"
"github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/topdown/builtins"
)
var (
jwtEncKey = ast.StringTerm("enc")
jwtCtyKey = ast.StringTerm("cty")
jwtIssKey = ast.StringTerm("iss")
jwtExpKey = ast.StringTerm("exp")
jwtNbfKey = ast.StringTerm("nbf")
jwtAudKey = ast.StringTerm("aud")
)
const (
headerJwt = "JWT"
)
// JSONWebToken represent the 3 parts (header, payload & signature) of
//
// a JWT in Base64.
type JSONWebToken struct {
header string
payload string
signature string
decodedHeader ast.Object
}
// decodeHeader populates the decodedHeader field.
func (token *JSONWebToken) decodeHeader() error {
result, err := getResult(builtinBase64UrlDecode, ast.StringTerm(token.header))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("JWT header had invalid encoding: %w", err)
}
decodedHeader, err := validateJWTHeader(string(result.Value.(ast.String)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
token.decodedHeader = decodedHeader
return nil
}
// Implements JWT decoding/validation based on RFC 7519 Section 7.2:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-7.2
// It does no data validation, it merely checks that the given string
// represents a structurally valid JWT. It supports JWTs using JWS compact
// serialization.
func builtinJWTDecode(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
token, err := decodeJWT(operands[0].Value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err = token.decodeHeader(); err != nil {
return err
}
p, err := getResult(builtinBase64UrlDecode, ast.StringTerm(token.payload))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("JWT payload had invalid encoding: %v", err)
}
if cty := token.decodedHeader.Get(jwtCtyKey); cty != nil {
ctyVal := string(cty.Value.(ast.String))
// It is possible for the contents of a token to be another
// token as a result of nested signing or encryption. To handle
// the case where we are given a token such as this, we check
// the content type and recurse on the payload if the content
// is "JWT".
// When the payload is itself another encoded JWT, then its
// contents are quoted (behavior of https://jwt.io/). To fix
// this, remove leading and trailing quotes.
if ctyVal == headerJwt {
p, err = getResult(builtinTrim, p, ast.StringTerm(`"'`))
if err != nil {
panic("not reached")
}
result, err := getResult(builtinJWTDecode, p)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return iter(result)
}
}
payload, err := extractJSONObject(string(p.Value.(ast.String)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
s, err := getResult(builtinBase64UrlDecode, ast.StringTerm(token.signature))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("JWT signature had invalid encoding: %v", err)
}
sign := hex.EncodeToString([]byte(s.Value.(ast.String)))
arr := []*ast.Term{
ast.NewTerm(token.decodedHeader),
ast.NewTerm(payload),
ast.StringTerm(sign),
}
return iter(ast.ArrayTerm(arr...))
}
// Implements RS256 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyRS256(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha256.New, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA256,
digest,
signature)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements RS384 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyRS384(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New384, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA384,
digest,
signature)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements RS512 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyRS512(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA512,
digest,
signature)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements PS256 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyPS256(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha256.New, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPSS(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA256,
digest,
signature,
nil)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements PS384 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyPS384(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New384, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPSS(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA384,
digest,
signature,
nil)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements PS512 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyPS512(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerifyRSA(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New, func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
return rsa.VerifyPSS(
publicKey,
crypto.SHA512,
digest,
signature,
nil)
})
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements RSA JWT signature verification.
func builtinJWTVerifyRSA(a ast.Value, b ast.Value, hasher func() hash.Hash, verify func(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, digest []byte, signature []byte) error) (ast.Value, error) {
return builtinJWTVerify(a, b, hasher, func(publicKey interface{}, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
publicKeyRsa, ok := publicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect public key type")
}
return verify(publicKeyRsa, digest, signature)
})
}
// Implements ES256 JWT signature verification.
func builtinJWTVerifyES256(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerify(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha256.New, verifyES)
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements ES384 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyES384(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerify(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New384, verifyES)
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
// Implements ES512 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyES512(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
result, err := builtinJWTVerify(operands[0].Value, operands[1].Value, sha512.New, verifyES)
if err == nil {
return iter(ast.NewTerm(result))
}
return err
}
func verifyES(publicKey interface{}, digest []byte, signature []byte) (err error) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("ECDSA signature verification error: %v", r)
}
}()
publicKeyEcdsa, ok := publicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect public key type")
}
r, s := &big.Int{}, &big.Int{}
n := len(signature) / 2
r.SetBytes(signature[:n])
s.SetBytes(signature[n:])
if ecdsa.Verify(publicKeyEcdsa, digest, r, s) {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("ECDSA signature verification error")
}
type verificationKey struct {
alg string
kid string
key interface{}
}
// getKeysFromCertOrJWK returns the public key found in a X.509 certificate or JWK key(s).
// A valid PEM block is never valid JSON (and vice versa), hence can try parsing both.
// When provided a JWKS, each key additionally likely contains a key ID and the key algorithm.
func getKeysFromCertOrJWK(certificate string) ([]verificationKey, error) {
if block, rest := pem.Decode([]byte(certificate)); block != nil {
if len(rest) > 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("extra data after a PEM certificate block")
}
if block.Type == blockTypeCertificate {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse a PEM certificate: %w", err)
}
return []verificationKey{{key: cert.PublicKey}}, nil
}
if block.Type == "PUBLIC KEY" {
key, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse a PEM public key: %w", err)
}
return []verificationKey{{key: key}}, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract a Key from the PEM certificate")
}
jwks, err := jwk.ParseString(certificate)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse a JWK key (set): %w", err)
}
keys := make([]verificationKey, 0, len(jwks.Keys))
for _, k := range jwks.Keys {
key, err := k.Materialize()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
keys = append(keys, verificationKey{
alg: k.GetAlgorithm().String(),
kid: k.GetKeyID(),
key: key,
})
}
return keys, nil
}
func getKeyByKid(kid string, keys []verificationKey) *verificationKey {
for _, key := range keys {
if key.kid == kid {
return &key
}
}
return nil
}
// Implements JWT signature verification.
func builtinJWTVerify(a ast.Value, b ast.Value, hasher func() hash.Hash, verify func(publicKey interface{}, digest []byte, signature []byte) error) (ast.Value, error) {
token, err := decodeJWT(a)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s, err := builtins.StringOperand(b, 2)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
keys, err := getKeysFromCertOrJWK(string(s))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signature, err := token.decodeSignature()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = token.decodeHeader()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
header, err := parseTokenHeader(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Validate the JWT signature
// First, check if there's a matching key ID (`kid`) in both token header and key(s).
// If a match is found, verify using only that key. Only applicable when a JWKS was provided.
if header.kid != "" {
if key := getKeyByKid(header.kid, keys); key != nil {
err = verify(key.key, getInputSHA([]byte(token.header+"."+token.payload), hasher), []byte(signature))
return ast.Boolean(err == nil), nil
}
}
// If no key ID matched, try to verify using any key in the set
// If an alg is present in both the JWT header and the key, skip verification unless they match
for _, key := range keys {
if key.alg == "" {
// No algorithm provided for the key - this is likely a certificate and not a JWKS, so
// we'll need to verify to find out
err = verify(key.key, getInputSHA([]byte(token.header+"."+token.payload), hasher), []byte(signature))
if err == nil {
return ast.Boolean(true), nil
}
} else {
if header.alg != key.alg {
continue
}
err = verify(key.key, getInputSHA([]byte(token.header+"."+token.payload), hasher), []byte(signature))
if err == nil {
return ast.Boolean(true), nil
}
}
}
// None of the keys worked, return false
return ast.Boolean(false), nil
}
// Implements HS256 (secret) JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyHS256(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
// Decode the JSON Web Token
token, err := decodeJWT(operands[0].Value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Process Secret input
astSecret, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[1].Value, 2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
secret := string(astSecret)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
_, err = mac.Write([]byte(token.header + "." + token.payload))
if err != nil {
return err
}
signature, err := token.decodeSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return iter(ast.NewTerm(ast.Boolean(hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), mac.Sum(nil)))))
}
// Implements HS384 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyHS384(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
// Decode the JSON Web Token
token, err := decodeJWT(operands[0].Value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Process Secret input
astSecret, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[1].Value, 2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
secret := string(astSecret)
mac := hmac.New(sha512.New384, []byte(secret))
_, err = mac.Write([]byte(token.header + "." + token.payload))
if err != nil {
return err
}
signature, err := token.decodeSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return iter(ast.NewTerm(ast.Boolean(hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), mac.Sum(nil)))))
}
// Implements HS512 JWT signature verification
func builtinJWTVerifyHS512(_ BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
// Decode the JSON Web Token
token, err := decodeJWT(operands[0].Value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Process Secret input
astSecret, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[1].Value, 2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
secret := string(astSecret)
mac := hmac.New(sha512.New, []byte(secret))
_, err = mac.Write([]byte(token.header + "." + token.payload))
if err != nil {
return err
}
signature, err := token.decodeSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return iter(ast.NewTerm(ast.Boolean(hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), mac.Sum(nil)))))
}
// -- Full JWT verification and decoding --
// Verification constraints. See tokens_test.go for unit tests.
// tokenConstraints holds decoded JWT verification constraints.
type tokenConstraints struct {
// The set of asymmetric keys we can verify with.
keys []verificationKey
// The single symmetric key we will verify with.
secret string
// The algorithm that must be used to verify.
// If "", any algorithm is acceptable.
alg string
// The required issuer.
// If "", any issuer is acceptable.
iss string
// The required audience.
// If "", no audience is acceptable.
aud string
// The time to validate against, or -1 if no constraint set.
// (If unset, the current time will be used.)
time float64
}
// tokenConstraintHandler is the handler type for JWT verification constraints.
type tokenConstraintHandler func(value ast.Value, parameters *tokenConstraints) error
// tokenConstraintTypes maps known JWT verification constraints to handlers.
var tokenConstraintTypes = map[string]tokenConstraintHandler{
"cert": tokenConstraintCert,
"secret": func(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
return tokenConstraintString("secret", value, &constraints.secret)
},
"alg": func(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
return tokenConstraintString("alg", value, &constraints.alg)
},
"iss": func(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
return tokenConstraintString("iss", value, &constraints.iss)
},
"aud": func(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
return tokenConstraintString("aud", value, &constraints.aud)
},
"time": tokenConstraintTime,
}
// tokenConstraintCert handles the `cert` constraint.
func tokenConstraintCert(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
s, ok := value.(ast.String)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("cert constraint: must be a string")
}
keys, err := getKeysFromCertOrJWK(string(s))
if err != nil {
return err
}
constraints.keys = keys
return nil
}
// tokenConstraintTime handles the `time` constraint.
func tokenConstraintTime(value ast.Value, constraints *tokenConstraints) error {
t, err := timeFromValue(value)
if err != nil {
return err
}
constraints.time = t
return nil
}
func timeFromValue(value ast.Value) (float64, error) {
time, ok := value.(ast.Number)
if !ok {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("token time constraint: must be a number")
}
timeFloat, ok := time.Float64()
if !ok {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("token time constraint: unvalid float64")
}
if timeFloat < 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("token time constraint: must not be negative")
}
return timeFloat, nil
}
// tokenConstraintString handles string constraints.
func tokenConstraintString(name string, value ast.Value, where *string) error {
av, ok := value.(ast.String)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%s constraint: must be a string", name)
}
*where = string(av)
return nil
}
// parseTokenConstraints parses the constraints argument.
func parseTokenConstraints(o ast.Object, wallclock *ast.Term) (*tokenConstraints, error) {
constraints := tokenConstraints{
time: -1,
}
if err := o.Iter(func(k *ast.Term, v *ast.Term) error {
name := string(k.Value.(ast.String))
handler, ok := tokenConstraintTypes[name]
if ok {
return handler(v.Value, &constraints)
}
// Anything unknown is rejected.
return fmt.Errorf("unknown token validation constraint: %s", name)
}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if constraints.time == -1 { // no time provided in constraint object
t, err := timeFromValue(wallclock.Value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
constraints.time = t
}
return &constraints, nil
}
// validate validates the constraints argument.
func (constraints *tokenConstraints) validate() error {
keys := 0
if constraints.keys != nil {
keys++
}
if constraints.secret != "" {
keys++
}
if keys > 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("duplicate key constraints")
}
if keys < 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("no key constraint")
}
return nil
}
// verify verifies a JWT using the constraints and the algorithm from the header
func (constraints *tokenConstraints) verify(kid, alg, header, payload, signature string) error {
// Construct the payload
plaintext := []byte(header)
plaintext = append(plaintext, []byte(".")...)
plaintext = append(plaintext, payload...)
// Look up the algorithm
a, ok := tokenAlgorithms[alg]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("unknown JWS algorithm: %s", alg)
}
// If we're configured with asymmetric key(s) then only trust that
if constraints.keys != nil {
if kid != "" {
if key := getKeyByKid(kid, constraints.keys); key != nil {
err := a.verify(key.key, a.hash, plaintext, []byte(signature))
if err != nil {
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
return nil
}
}
verified := false
for _, key := range constraints.keys {
if key.alg == "" {
err := a.verify(key.key, a.hash, plaintext, []byte(signature))
if err == nil {
verified = true
break
}
} else {
if alg != key.alg {
continue
}
err := a.verify(key.key, a.hash, plaintext, []byte(signature))
if err == nil {
verified = true
break
}
}
}
if !verified {
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
return nil
}
if constraints.secret != "" {
return a.verify([]byte(constraints.secret), a.hash, plaintext, []byte(signature))
}
// (*tokenConstraints)validate() should prevent this happening
return errors.New("unexpectedly found no keys to trust")
}
// validAudience checks the audience of the JWT.
// It returns true if it meets the constraints and false otherwise.
func (constraints *tokenConstraints) validAudience(aud ast.Value) bool {
s, ok := aud.(ast.String)
if ok {
return string(s) == constraints.aud
}
a, ok := aud.(*ast.Array)
if !ok {
return false
}
return a.Until(func(elem *ast.Term) bool {
if s, ok := elem.Value.(ast.String); ok {
return string(s) == constraints.aud
}
return false
})
}
// JWT algorithms
type (
tokenVerifyFunction func(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, payload []byte, signature []byte) error
tokenVerifyAsymmetricFunction func(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, signature []byte) error
)
// jwtAlgorithm describes a JWS 'alg' value
type tokenAlgorithm struct {
hash crypto.Hash
verify tokenVerifyFunction
}
// tokenAlgorithms is the known JWT algorithms
var tokenAlgorithms = map[string]tokenAlgorithm{
"RS256": {crypto.SHA256, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPKCS)},
"RS384": {crypto.SHA384, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPKCS)},
"RS512": {crypto.SHA512, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPKCS)},
"PS256": {crypto.SHA256, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPSS)},
"PS384": {crypto.SHA384, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPSS)},
"PS512": {crypto.SHA512, verifyAsymmetric(verifyRSAPSS)},
"ES256": {crypto.SHA256, verifyAsymmetric(verifyECDSA)},
"ES384": {crypto.SHA384, verifyAsymmetric(verifyECDSA)},
"ES512": {crypto.SHA512, verifyAsymmetric(verifyECDSA)},
"HS256": {crypto.SHA256, verifyHMAC},
"HS384": {crypto.SHA384, verifyHMAC},
"HS512": {crypto.SHA512, verifyHMAC},
}
// errSignatureNotVerified is returned when a signature cannot be verified.
var errSignatureNotVerified = errors.New("signature not verified")
func verifyHMAC(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, payload []byte, signature []byte) error {
macKey, ok := key.([]byte)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect symmetric key type")
}
mac := hmac.New(hash.New, macKey)
if _, err := mac.Write(payload); err != nil {
return err
}
if !hmac.Equal(signature, mac.Sum([]byte{})) {
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
return nil
}
func verifyAsymmetric(verify tokenVerifyAsymmetricFunction) tokenVerifyFunction {
return func(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, payload []byte, signature []byte) error {
h := hash.New()
h.Write(payload)
return verify(key, hash, h.Sum([]byte{}), signature)
}
}
func verifyRSAPKCS(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
publicKeyRsa, ok := key.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect public key type")
}
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(publicKeyRsa, hash, digest, signature); err != nil {
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
return nil
}
func verifyRSAPSS(key interface{}, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte, signature []byte) error {
publicKeyRsa, ok := key.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect public key type")
}
if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(publicKeyRsa, hash, digest, signature, nil); err != nil {
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
return nil
}
func verifyECDSA(key interface{}, _ crypto.Hash, digest []byte, signature []byte) (err error) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("ECDSA signature verification error: %v", r)
}
}()
publicKeyEcdsa, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("incorrect public key type")
}
r, s := &big.Int{}, &big.Int{}
n := len(signature) / 2
r.SetBytes(signature[:n])
s.SetBytes(signature[n:])
if ecdsa.Verify(publicKeyEcdsa, digest, r, s) {
return nil
}
return errSignatureNotVerified
}
// JWT header parsing and parameters. See tokens_test.go for unit tests.
// tokenHeaderType represents a recognized JWT header field
// tokenHeader is a parsed JWT header
type tokenHeader struct {
alg string
kid string
typ string
cty string
crit map[string]bool
unknown []string
}
// tokenHeaderHandler handles a JWT header parameters
type tokenHeaderHandler func(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error
// tokenHeaderTypes maps known JWT header parameters to handlers
var tokenHeaderTypes = map[string]tokenHeaderHandler{
"alg": func(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error {
return tokenHeaderString("alg", &header.alg, value)
},
"kid": func(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error {
return tokenHeaderString("kid", &header.kid, value)
},
"typ": func(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error {
return tokenHeaderString("typ", &header.typ, value)
},
"cty": func(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error {
return tokenHeaderString("cty", &header.cty, value)
},
"crit": tokenHeaderCrit,
}
// tokenHeaderCrit handles the 'crit' header parameter
func tokenHeaderCrit(header *tokenHeader, value ast.Value) error {
v, ok := value.(*ast.Array)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("crit: must be a list")
}
header.crit = map[string]bool{}
_ = v.Iter(func(elem *ast.Term) error {
tv, ok := elem.Value.(ast.String)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("crit: must be a list of strings")
}
header.crit[string(tv)] = true
return nil
})
if len(header.crit) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("crit: must be a nonempty list") // 'MUST NOT' use the empty list
}
return nil
}
// tokenHeaderString handles string-format JWT header parameters
func tokenHeaderString(name string, where *string, value ast.Value) error {
v, ok := value.(ast.String)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: must be a string", name)
}
*where = string(v)
return nil
}
// parseTokenHeader parses the JWT header.
func parseTokenHeader(token *JSONWebToken) (*tokenHeader, error) {
header := tokenHeader{
unknown: []string{},
}
if err := token.decodedHeader.Iter(func(k *ast.Term, v *ast.Term) error {
ks := string(k.Value.(ast.String))
handler, ok := tokenHeaderTypes[ks]
if !ok {
header.unknown = append(header.unknown, ks)
return nil
}
return handler(&header, v.Value)
}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &header, nil
}
// validTokenHeader returns true if the JOSE header is valid, otherwise false.
func (header *tokenHeader) valid() bool {
// RFC7515 s4.1.1 alg MUST be present
if header.alg == "" {
return false
}
// RFC7515 4.1.11 JWS is invalid if there is a critical parameter that we did not recognize
for _, u := range header.unknown {
if header.crit[u] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func commonBuiltinJWTEncodeSign(bctx BuiltinContext, inputHeaders, jwsPayload, jwkSrc string, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
keys, err := jwk.ParseString(jwkSrc)
if err != nil {
return err
}
key, err := keys.Keys[0].Materialize()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if jwk.GetKeyTypeFromKey(key) != keys.Keys[0].GetKeyType() {
return fmt.Errorf("JWK derived key type and keyType parameter do not match")
}
standardHeaders := &jws.StandardHeaders{}
jwsHeaders := []byte(inputHeaders)
err = json.Unmarshal(jwsHeaders, standardHeaders)
if err != nil {
return err
}
alg := standardHeaders.GetAlgorithm()
if alg == jwa.Unsupported {
return fmt.Errorf("unknown signature algorithm")
}
if (standardHeaders.Type == "" || standardHeaders.Type == headerJwt) && !json.Valid([]byte(jwsPayload)) {
return fmt.Errorf("type is JWT but payload is not JSON")
}
// process payload and sign
var jwsCompact []byte
jwsCompact, err = jws.SignLiteral([]byte(jwsPayload), alg, key, jwsHeaders, bctx.Seed)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return iter(ast.StringTerm(string(jwsCompact)))
}
func builtinJWTEncodeSign(bctx BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
inputHeadersAsJSON, err := ast.JSON(operands[0].Value)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to prepare JWT headers for marshalling: %v", err)
}
inputHeadersBs, err := json.Marshal(inputHeadersAsJSON)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal JWT headers: %v", err)
}
payloadAsJSON, err := ast.JSON(operands[1].Value)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to prepare JWT payload for marshalling: %v", err)
}
payloadBs, err := json.Marshal(payloadAsJSON)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal JWT payload: %v", err)
}
signatureAsJSON, err := ast.JSON(operands[2].Value)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to prepare JWT signature for marshalling: %v", err)
}
signatureBs, err := json.Marshal(signatureAsJSON)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal JWT signature: %v", err)
}
return commonBuiltinJWTEncodeSign(
bctx,
string(inputHeadersBs),
string(payloadBs),
string(signatureBs),
iter,
)
}
func builtinJWTEncodeSignRaw(bctx BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
jwkSrc, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[2].Value, 3)
if err != nil {
return err
}
inputHeaders, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[0].Value, 1)
if err != nil {
return err
}
jwsPayload, err := builtins.StringOperand(operands[1].Value, 2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return commonBuiltinJWTEncodeSign(bctx, string(inputHeaders), string(jwsPayload), string(jwkSrc), iter)
}
// Implements full JWT decoding, validation and verification.
func builtinJWTDecodeVerify(bctx BuiltinContext, operands []*ast.Term, iter func(*ast.Term) error) error {
// io.jwt.decode_verify(string, constraints, [valid, header, payload])
//
// If valid is true then the signature verifies and all constraints are met.
// If valid is false then either the signature did not verify or some constrain
// was not met.
//
// Decoding errors etc are returned as errors.
a := operands[0].Value
b, err := builtins.ObjectOperand(operands[1].Value, 2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
unverified := ast.ArrayTerm(
ast.BooleanTerm(false),
ast.NewTerm(ast.NewObject()),
ast.NewTerm(ast.NewObject()),
)
constraints, err := parseTokenConstraints(b, bctx.Time)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := constraints.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
var token *JSONWebToken
var p *ast.Term
for {
// RFC7519 7.2 #1-2 split into parts
if token, err = decodeJWT(a); err != nil {
return err
}
// RFC7519 7.2 #3, #4, #6
if err := token.decodeHeader(); err != nil {
return err
}
// RFC7159 7.2 #5 (and RFC7159 5.2 #5) validate header fields
header, err := parseTokenHeader(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !header.valid() {
return iter(unverified)
}
// Check constraints that impact signature verification.
if constraints.alg != "" && constraints.alg != header.alg {
return iter(unverified)
}
// RFC7159 7.2 #7 verify the signature
signature, err := token.decodeSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := constraints.verify(header.kid, header.alg, token.header, token.payload, signature); err != nil {
if err == errSignatureNotVerified {
return iter(unverified)
}
return err
}
// RFC7159 7.2 #9-10 decode the payload
p, err = getResult(builtinBase64UrlDecode, ast.StringTerm(token.payload))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("JWT payload had invalid encoding: %v", err)
}
// RFC7159 7.2 #8 and 5.2 cty
if strings.ToUpper(header.cty) == headerJwt {
// Nested JWT, go round again with payload as first argument
a = p.Value
continue
}
// Non-nested JWT (or we've reached the bottom of the nesting).
break
}
payload, err := extractJSONObject(string(p.Value.(ast.String)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check registered claim names against constraints or environment
// RFC7159 4.1.1 iss
if constraints.iss != "" {
if iss := payload.Get(jwtIssKey); iss != nil {
issVal := string(iss.Value.(ast.String))
if constraints.iss != issVal {
return iter(unverified)
}
} else {
return iter(unverified)
}
}
// RFC7159 4.1.3 aud
if aud := payload.Get(jwtAudKey); aud != nil {
if !constraints.validAudience(aud.Value) {
return iter(unverified)
}
} else {
if constraints.aud != "" {
return iter(unverified)
}
}
// RFC7159 4.1.4 exp
if exp := payload.Get(jwtExpKey); exp != nil {
switch exp.Value.(type) {
case ast.Number:
// constraints.time is in nanoseconds but exp Value is in seconds
compareTime := ast.FloatNumberTerm(constraints.time / 1000000000)
if ast.Compare(compareTime, exp.Value.(ast.Number)) != -1 {
return iter(unverified)
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("exp value must be a number")
}
}
// RFC7159 4.1.5 nbf
if nbf := payload.Get(jwtNbfKey); nbf != nil {
switch nbf.Value.(type) {
case ast.Number:
// constraints.time is in nanoseconds but nbf Value is in seconds
compareTime := ast.FloatNumberTerm(constraints.time / 1000000000)
if ast.Compare(compareTime, nbf.Value.(ast.Number)) == -1 {
return iter(unverified)
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("nbf value must be a number")
}
}
verified := ast.ArrayTerm(
ast.BooleanTerm(true),
ast.NewTerm(token.decodedHeader),
ast.NewTerm(payload),
)
return iter(verified)
}
// -- Utilities --
func decodeJWT(a ast.Value) (*JSONWebToken, error) {
// Parse the JSON Web Token
astEncode, err := builtins.StringOperand(a, 1)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
encoding := string(astEncode)
if !strings.Contains(encoding, ".") {
return nil, errors.New("encoded JWT had no period separators")
}
parts := strings.Split(encoding, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encoded JWT must have 3 sections, found %d", len(parts))
}
return &JSONWebToken{header: parts[0], payload: parts[1], signature: parts[2]}, nil
}
func (token *JSONWebToken) decodeSignature() (string, error) {
decodedSignature, err := getResult(builtinBase64UrlDecode, ast.StringTerm(token.signature))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
signatureAst, err := builtins.StringOperand(decodedSignature.Value, 1)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(signatureAst), err
}
// Extract, validate and return the JWT header as an ast.Object.
func validateJWTHeader(h string) (ast.Object, error) {
header, err := extractJSONObject(h)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad JWT header: %v", err)
}
// There are two kinds of JWT tokens, a JSON Web Signature (JWS) and
// a JSON Web Encryption (JWE). The latter is very involved, and we
// won't support it for now.
// This code checks which kind of JWT we are dealing with according to
// RFC 7516 Section 9: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516#section-9
if header.Get(jwtEncKey) != nil {
return nil, errors.New("JWT is a JWE object, which is not supported")
}
return header, nil
}
func extractJSONObject(s string) (ast.Object, error) {
// XXX: This code relies on undocumented behavior of Go's
// json.Unmarshal using the last occurrence of duplicate keys in a JSON
// Object. If duplicate keys are present in a JWT, the last must be
// used or the token rejected. Since detecting duplicates is tantamount
// to parsing it ourselves, we're relying on the Go implementation
// using the last occurring instance of the key, which is the behavior
// as of Go 1.8.1.
v, err := getResult(builtinJSONUnmarshal, ast.StringTerm(s))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JSON: %v", err)
}
o, ok := v.Value.(ast.Object)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("decoded JSON type was not an Object")
}
return o, nil
}
// getInputSha returns the SHA checksum of the input
func getInputSHA(input []byte, h func() hash.Hash) []byte {
hasher := h()
hasher.Write(input)
return hasher.Sum(nil)
}
func init() {
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTDecode.Name, builtinJWTDecode)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyRS256.Name, builtinJWTVerifyRS256)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyRS384.Name, builtinJWTVerifyRS384)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyRS512.Name, builtinJWTVerifyRS512)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyPS256.Name, builtinJWTVerifyPS256)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyPS384.Name, builtinJWTVerifyPS384)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyPS512.Name, builtinJWTVerifyPS512)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyES256.Name, builtinJWTVerifyES256)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyES384.Name, builtinJWTVerifyES384)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyES512.Name, builtinJWTVerifyES512)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyHS256.Name, builtinJWTVerifyHS256)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyHS384.Name, builtinJWTVerifyHS384)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTVerifyHS512.Name, builtinJWTVerifyHS512)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTDecodeVerify.Name, builtinJWTDecodeVerify)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTEncodeSignRaw.Name, builtinJWTEncodeSignRaw)
RegisterBuiltinFunc(ast.JWTEncodeSign.Name, builtinJWTEncodeSign)
}