admin/kubesphere
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

update dependencies (#6267)

Browse Source 
Signed-off-by: hongming <coder.scala@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
hongming
2024-11-06 10:27:06 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent faf255a084
commit cfebd96a1f
4263 changed files with 341374 additions and 132036 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -10,12 +10,13 @@
// References:
//
// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00
package agent // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent"
package agent
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/dsa"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
@@ -26,7 +27,6 @@ import (
"math/big"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
@@ -141,9 +141,14 @@ const (
agentAddSmartcardKeyConstrained = 26
// 3.7 Key constraint identifiers
agentConstrainLifetime = 1
agentConstrainConfirm = 2
agentConstrainExtension = 3
agentConstrainLifetime = 1
agentConstrainConfirm = 2
// Constraint extension identifier up to version 2 of the protocol. A
// backward incompatible change will be required if we want to add support
// for SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN which uses the same ID.
agentConstrainExtensionV00 = 3
// Constraint extension identifier in version 3 and later of the protocol.
agentConstrainExtension = 255
)
// maxAgentResponseBytes is the maximum agent reply size that is accepted. This
@@ -205,7 +210,7 @@ type constrainLifetimeAgentMsg struct {
}
type constrainExtensionAgentMsg struct {
ExtensionName string `sshtype:"3"`
ExtensionName string `sshtype:"255|3"`
ExtensionDetails []byte
// Rest is a field used for parsing, not part of message

9
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -175,6 +175,15 @@ func (r *keyring) Add(key AddedKey) error {
p.expire = &t
}
// If we already have a Signer with the same public key, replace it with the
// new one.
for idx, k := range r.keys {
if bytes.Equal(k.signer.PublicKey().Marshal(), p.signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) {
r.keys[idx] = p
return nil
}
}
r.keys = append(r.keys, p)
return nil

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ package agent
import (
"crypto/dsa"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/binary"
@@ -16,11 +17,10 @@ import (
"log"
"math/big"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// Server wraps an Agent and uses it to implement the agent side of
// server wraps an Agent and uses it to implement the agent side of
// the SSH-agent, wire protocol.
type server struct {
agent Agent
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ func parseConstraints(constraints []byte) (lifetimeSecs uint32, confirmBeforeUse
case agentConstrainConfirm:
confirmBeforeUse = true
constraints = constraints[1:]
case agentConstrainExtension:
case agentConstrainExtension, agentConstrainExtensionV00:
var msg constrainExtensionAgentMsg
if err = ssh.Unmarshal(constraints, &msg); err != nil {
return 0, false, nil, err

38
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ import (
// Certificate algorithm names from [PROTOCOL.certkeys]. These values can appear
// in Certificate.Type, PublicKey.Type, and ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms.
// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner and don't
// appear in the Signature.Format field.
// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner nor
// returned by MultiAlgorithmSigner and don't appear in the Signature.Format
// field.
const (
CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
@@ -255,10 +256,17 @@ func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key")
}
if algorithmSigner, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner); ok {
switch s := signer.(type) {
case MultiAlgorithmSigner:
return &multiAlgorithmSigner{
AlgorithmSigner: &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{
&openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s},
supportedAlgorithms: s.Algorithms(),
}, nil
case AlgorithmSigner:
return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{
&openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, algorithmSigner}, nil
} else {
&openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, nil
default:
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
}
}
@@ -432,7 +440,9 @@ func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
}
// SignCert signs the certificate with an authority, setting the Nonce,
// SignatureKey, and Signature fields.
// SignatureKey, and Signature fields. If the authority implements the
// MultiAlgorithmSigner interface the first algorithm in the list is used. This
// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm.
func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil {
@@ -440,8 +450,20 @@ func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
}
c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey()
// Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers.
if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA {
if v, ok := authority.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok {
if len(v.Algorithms()) == 0 {
return errors.New("the provided authority has no signature algorithm")
}
// Use the first algorithm in the list.
sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), v.Algorithms()[0])
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.Signature = sig
return nil
} else if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA {
// Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers.
// TODO: consider using KeyAlgoRSASHA256 as default.
sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), KeyAlgoRSASHA512)
if err != nil {
return err

28
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -187,9 +187,11 @@ type channel struct {
pending *buffer
extPending *buffer
// windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window.
windowMu sync.Mutex
myWindow uint32
// windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window, and myConsumed,
// the number of bytes consumed since we last increased myWindow
windowMu sync.Mutex
myWindow uint32
myConsumed uint32
// writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and
// protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be
@@ -332,14 +334,24 @@ func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
return nil
}
func (c *channel) adjustWindow(n uint32) error {
func (c *channel) adjustWindow(adj uint32) error {
c.windowMu.Lock()
// Since myWindow is managed on our side, and can never exceed
// the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow.
c.myWindow += uint32(n)
// Since myConsumed and myWindow are managed on our side, and can never
// exceed the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow.
c.myConsumed += adj
var sendAdj uint32
if (channelWindowSize-c.myWindow > 3*c.maxIncomingPayload) ||
(c.myWindow < channelWindowSize/2) {
sendAdj = c.myConsumed
c.myConsumed = 0
c.myWindow += sendAdj
}
c.windowMu.Unlock()
if sendAdj == 0 {
return nil
}
return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{
AdditionalBytes: uint32(n),
AdditionalBytes: sendAdj,
})
}

3
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{
"arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)},
// AEAD ciphers
gcmCipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher},
gcm128CipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher},
gcm256CipherID: {32, 12, newGCMCipher},
chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher},
// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan
if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %v", err)
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %w", err)
}
conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport)
return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil

134
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -71,7 +71,13 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; {
ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions)
if err != nil {
return err
// On disconnect, return error immediately
if _, ok := err.(*disconnectMsg); ok {
return err
}
// We return the error later if there is no other method left to
// try.
ok = authFailure
}
if ok == authSuccess {
// success
@@ -101,6 +107,12 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
}
}
}
if auth == nil && err != nil {
// We have an error and there are no other authentication methods to
// try, so we return it.
return err
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", tried)
}
@@ -217,21 +229,45 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string {
return "publickey"
}
func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (as AlgorithmSigner, algo string) {
func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, string, error) {
var as MultiAlgorithmSigner
keyFormat := signer.PublicKey().Type()
// Like in sendKexInit, if the public key implements AlgorithmSigner we
// assume it supports all algorithms, otherwise only the key format one.
as, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
return algorithmSignerWrapper{signer}, keyFormat
// If the signer implements MultiAlgorithmSigner we use the algorithms it
// support, if it implements AlgorithmSigner we assume it supports all
// algorithms, otherwise only the key format one.
switch s := signer.(type) {
case MultiAlgorithmSigner:
as = s
case AlgorithmSigner:
as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{
AlgorithmSigner: s,
supportedAlgorithms: algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)),
}
default:
as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{
AlgorithmSigner: algorithmSignerWrapper{signer},
supportedAlgorithms: []string{underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)},
}
}
getFallbackAlgo := func() (string, error) {
// Fallback to use if there is no "server-sig-algs" extension or a
// common algorithm cannot be found. We use the public key format if the
// MultiAlgorithmSigner supports it, otherwise we return an error.
if !contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common public key signature algorithm, server only supports %q for key type %q, signer only supports %v",
underlyingAlgo(keyFormat), keyFormat, as.Algorithms())
}
return keyFormat, nil
}
extPayload, ok := extensions["server-sig-algs"]
if !ok {
// If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension, fall back to the key
// format algorithm.
return as, keyFormat
// If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension use the fallback
// algorithm.
algo, err := getFallbackAlgo()
return as, algo, err
}
// The server-sig-algs extension only carries underlying signature
@@ -245,15 +281,22 @@ func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (as Alg
}
}
keyAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)
// Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner.
var keyAlgos []string
for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) {
if contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo)
}
}
algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos)
if err != nil {
// If there is no overlap, try the key anyway with the key format
// algorithm, to support servers that fail to list all supported
// algorithms.
return as, keyFormat
// If there is no overlap, return the fallback algorithm to support
// servers that fail to list all supported algorithms.
algo, err := getFallbackAlgo()
return as, algo, err
}
return as, algo
return as, algo, nil
}
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
@@ -267,14 +310,39 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
return authFailure, nil, err
}
var methods []string
for _, signer := range signers {
pub := signer.PublicKey()
as, algo := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions)
var errSigAlgo error
origSignersLen := len(signers)
for idx := 0; idx < len(signers); idx++ {
signer := signers[idx]
pub := signer.PublicKey()
as, algo, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions)
if err != nil && errSigAlgo == nil {
// If we cannot negotiate a signature algorithm store the first
// error so we can return it to provide a more meaningful message if
// no other signers work.
errSigAlgo = err
continue
}
ok, err := validateKey(pub, algo, user, c)
if err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
// OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 advertises support for rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512
// in the "server-sig-algs" extension but doesn't support these
// algorithms for certificate authentication, so if the server rejects
// the key try to use the obtained algorithm as if "server-sig-algs" had
// not been implemented if supported from the algorithm signer.
if !ok && idx < origSignersLen && isRSACert(algo) && algo != CertAlgoRSAv01 {
if contains(as.Algorithms(), KeyAlgoRSA) {
// We retry using the compat algorithm after all signers have
// been tried normally.
signers = append(signers, &multiAlgorithmSigner{
AlgorithmSigner: as,
supportedAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA},
})
}
}
if !ok {
continue
}
@@ -317,22 +385,12 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
// other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
// additional authentication methods are required.
if success == authSuccess || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
if success == authSuccess || !contains(methods, cb.method()) {
return success, methods, err
}
}
return authFailure, methods, nil
}
func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool {
for _, m := range methods {
if m == method {
return true
}
}
return false
return authFailure, methods, errSigAlgo
}
// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server.
@@ -350,10 +408,10 @@ func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, e
return false, err
}
return confirmKeyAck(key, algo, c)
return confirmKeyAck(key, c)
}
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
for {
@@ -371,7 +429,15 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if msg.Algo != algo || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
// According to RFC 4252 Section 7 the algorithm in
// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK should match that of the request but some
// servers send the key type instead. OpenSSH allows any algorithm
// that matches the public key, so we do the same.
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/86bdd385/sshconnect2.c#L709
if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) {
return false, nil
}
if !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil

71
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"strings"
"sync"
_ "crypto/sha1"
@@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ const (
// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend.
var supportedCiphers = []string{
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID,
chacha20Poly1305ID,
"arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour",
aes128cbcID,
@@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ var supportedCiphers = []string{
// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers.
var preferredCiphers = []string{
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID,
chacha20Poly1305ID,
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
}
@@ -49,7 +48,8 @@ var supportedKexAlgos = []string{
// P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't
// reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK.
kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH16SHA512, kexAlgoDH14SHA1,
kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
}
// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden
@@ -59,8 +59,9 @@ var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{
kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests
}
// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange algorithms
// in preference order.
// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange
// algorithms in preference order. The diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 algorithm
// is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than the others.
var preferredKexAlgos = []string{
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH,
kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
@@ -70,12 +71,12 @@ var preferredKexAlgos = []string{
// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods
// of authenticating servers) in preference order.
var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSASHA256v01,
CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521,
KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA,
KeyAlgoED25519,
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed
// because they have reached the end of their useful life.
var supportedMACs = []string{
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha2-512", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
}
var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone}
@@ -119,6 +120,21 @@ func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string {
}
}
// isRSA returns whether algo is a supported RSA algorithm, including certificate
// algorithms.
func isRSA(algo string) bool {
algos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(KeyAlgoRSA)
return contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo))
}
func isRSACert(algo string) bool {
_, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]
if !ok {
return false
}
return isRSA(algo)
}
// supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key
// authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate types
// since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the client if
@@ -131,8 +147,6 @@ var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{
KeyAlgoDSA,
}
var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList = strings.Join(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, ",")
// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't
// match what we wanted.
func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error {
@@ -168,7 +182,7 @@ func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
// 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is
// 128.
switch a.Cipher {
case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcmCipherID, aes128cbcID:
case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcm128CipherID, gcm256CipherID, aes128cbcID:
return 16 * (1 << 32)
}
@@ -178,7 +192,8 @@ func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
}
var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{
gcmCipherID: true,
gcm128CipherID: true,
gcm256CipherID: true,
chacha20Poly1305ID: true,
}
@@ -261,16 +276,16 @@ type Config struct {
// unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used.
RekeyThreshold uint64
// The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a
// default set of algorithms is used.
// The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a default set
// of algorithms is used. Unsupported values are silently ignored.
KeyExchanges []string
// The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible
// default is used.
// The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is
// used. Unsupported values are silently ignored.
Ciphers []string
// The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default
// is used.
// The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is
// used. Unsupported values are silently ignored.
MACs []string
}
@@ -287,7 +302,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
var ciphers []string
for _, c := range c.Ciphers {
if cipherModes[c] != nil {
// reject the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition
// Ignore the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition.
ciphers = append(ciphers, c)
}
}
@@ -296,10 +311,26 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
if c.KeyExchanges == nil {
c.KeyExchanges = preferredKexAlgos
}
var kexs []string
for _, k := range c.KeyExchanges {
if kexAlgoMap[k] != nil {
// Ignore the KEX if we have no kexAlgoMap definition.
kexs = append(kexs, k)
}
}
c.KeyExchanges = kexs
if c.MACs == nil {
c.MACs = supportedMACs
}
var macs []string
for _, m := range c.MACs {
if macModes[m] != nil {
// Ignore the MAC if we have no macModes definition.
macs = append(macs, m)
}
}
c.MACs = macs
if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 {
// cipher specific default

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ func (c *connection) Close() error {
return c.sshConn.conn.Close()
}
// sshconn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and
// sshConn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and
// writes.
type sshConn struct {
conn net.Conn

3
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ others.
References:
[PROTOCOL]: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?rev=HEAD
[PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD
[SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1
This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself,
so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise.
*/
package ssh // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
package ssh

107
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"io"
"log"
"net"
"strings"
"sync"
)
@@ -34,6 +35,16 @@ type keyingTransport interface {
// direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent
// or received.
prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error
// setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering
// sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys.
// If the sequence number is already > 1 when setStrictMode
// is called, an error is returned.
setStrictMode() error
// setInitialKEXDone indicates to the transport that the initial key exchange
// was completed
setInitialKEXDone()
}
// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport
@@ -50,6 +61,10 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
// connection.
hostKeys []Signer
// publicKeyAuthAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the server. In that case,
// it contains the supported client public key authentication algorithms.
publicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string
// hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case,
// we accept these key types from the server as host key.
hostKeyAlgorithms []string
@@ -95,6 +110,10 @@ type handshakeTransport struct {
// The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet.
sessionID []byte
// strictMode indicates if the other side of the handshake indicated
// that we should be following the strict KEX protocol restrictions.
strictMode bool
}
type pendingKex struct {
@@ -141,6 +160,7 @@ func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byt
func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport {
t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion)
t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys
t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms = config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms
go t.readLoop()
go t.kexLoop()
return t
@@ -203,7 +223,10 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() {
close(t.incoming)
break
}
if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug {
// If this is the first kex, and strict KEX mode is enabled,
// we don't ignore any messages, as they may be used to manipulate
// the packet sequence numbers.
if !(t.sessionID == nil && t.strictMode) && (p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug) {
continue
}
t.incoming <- p
@@ -435,6 +458,11 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) {
return successPacket, nil
}
const (
kexStrictClient = "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"
kexStrictServer = "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"
)
// sendKexInit sends a key change message.
func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
t.mu.Lock()
@@ -448,7 +476,6 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
}
msg := &kexInitMsg{
KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges,
CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers,
CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers,
MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs,
@@ -458,36 +485,55 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
}
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:])
// We mutate the KexAlgos slice, in order to add the kex-strict extension algorithm,
// and possibly to add the ext-info extension algorithm. Since the slice may be the
// user owned KeyExchanges, we create our own slice in order to avoid using user
// owned memory by mistake.
msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+2) // room for kex-strict and ext-info
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...)
isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0
if isServer {
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
// If k is an AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all signature algorithms
// associated with the key format. (Ideally AlgorithmSigner would have a
// method to advertise supported algorithms, but it doesn't. This means that
// adding support for a new algorithm is a breaking change, as we will
// immediately negotiate it even if existing implementations don't support
// it. If that ever happens, we'll have to figure something out.)
// If k is not an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the
// algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign can't pick
// a different default.)
// If k is a MultiAlgorithmSigner, we restrict the signature
// algorithms. If k is a AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all
// signature algorithms associated with the key format. If k is not
// an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the
// algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign
// can't pick a different default).
keyFormat := k.PublicKey().Type()
if _, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner); ok {
switch s := k.(type) {
case MultiAlgorithmSigner:
for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) {
if contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algo)
}
}
case AlgorithmSigner:
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)...)
} else {
default:
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat)
}
}
if t.sessionID == nil {
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)
}
} else {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms
// As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what
// algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC
// 8308, Section 2.1.
//
// We also send the strict KEX mode extension algorithm, in order to opt
// into the strict KEX mode.
if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange {
msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+1)
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...)
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c")
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient)
}
}
packet := Marshal(msg)
@@ -593,6 +639,13 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
return err
}
if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) {
t.strictMode = true
if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it.
//
// RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for
@@ -642,16 +695,21 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
// On the server side, after the first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO
// message with the server-sig-algs extension if the client supports it. See
// RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1.
// RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1, and [PROTOCOL], Section 1.9.
if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") {
supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList := strings.Join(t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms, ",")
extInfo := &extInfoMsg{
NumExtensions: 1,
Payload: make([]byte, 0, 4+15+4+len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)),
NumExtensions: 2,
Payload: make([]byte, 0, 4+15+4+len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)+4+16+4+1),
}
extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("server-sig-algs"))
extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "server-sig-algs"...)
extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList))
extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList...)
extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("ping@openssh.com"))
extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "ping@openssh.com"...)
extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, 1)
extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "0"...)
if err := t.conn.writePacket(Marshal(extInfo)); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -663,6 +721,12 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0])
}
if firstKeyExchange {
// Indicates to the transport that the first key exchange is completed
// after receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.
t.conn.setInitialKEXDone()
}
return nil
}
@@ -685,9 +749,16 @@ func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, a
func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner {
for _, k := range hostKeys {
if s, ok := k.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok {
if !contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
continue
}
}
if algo == k.PublicKey().Type() {
return algorithmSignerWrapper{k}
}
k, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
continue

12
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const (
kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
kexAlgoDH16SHA512 = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
@@ -430,6 +431,17 @@ func init() {
hashFunc: crypto.SHA256,
}
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC
// 8268 and Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526.
p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
hashFunc: crypto.SHA512,
}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}

453
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -11,13 +11,16 @@ import (
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/dsa"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
@@ -26,7 +29,6 @@ import (
"math/big"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf"
)
@@ -295,6 +297,18 @@ func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte {
return b.Bytes()
}
// MarshalPrivateKey returns a PEM block with the private key serialized in the
// OpenSSH format.
func MarshalPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string) (*pem.Block, error) {
return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler)
}
// MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a PEM block holding the encrypted
// private key serialized in the OpenSSH format.
func MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, passphrase []byte) (*pem.Block, error) {
return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase))
}
// PublicKey represents a public key using an unspecified algorithm.
//
// Some PublicKeys provided by this package also implement CryptoPublicKey.
@@ -321,7 +335,7 @@ type CryptoPublicKey interface {
// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key.
//
// Some Signers provided by this package also implement AlgorithmSigner.
// Some Signers provided by this package also implement MultiAlgorithmSigner.
type Signer interface {
// PublicKey returns the associated PublicKey.
PublicKey() PublicKey
@@ -336,9 +350,9 @@ type Signer interface {
// An AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying an algorithm to
// use for signing.
//
// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, so it should
// be prepared to be invoked with every algorithm supported by the public key
// format.
// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, unless it also
// implements MultiAlgorithmSigner, so it should be prepared to be invoked with
// every algorithm supported by the public key format.
type AlgorithmSigner interface {
Signer
@@ -349,6 +363,75 @@ type AlgorithmSigner interface {
SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error)
}
// MultiAlgorithmSigner is an AlgorithmSigner that also reports the algorithms
// supported by that signer.
type MultiAlgorithmSigner interface {
AlgorithmSigner
// Algorithms returns the available algorithms in preference order. The list
// must not be empty, and it must not include certificate types.
Algorithms() []string
}
// NewSignerWithAlgorithms returns a signer restricted to the specified
// algorithms. The algorithms must be set in preference order. The list must not
// be empty, and it must not include certificate types. An error is returned if
// the specified algorithms are incompatible with the public key type.
func NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer AlgorithmSigner, algorithms []string) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, error) {
if len(algorithms) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: please specify at least one valid signing algorithm")
}
var signerAlgos []string
supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(signer.PublicKey().Type()))
if s, ok := signer.(*multiAlgorithmSigner); ok {
signerAlgos = s.Algorithms()
} else {
signerAlgos = supportedAlgos
}
for _, algo := range algorithms {
if !contains(supportedAlgos, algo) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported for key type %q",
algo, signer.PublicKey().Type())
}
if !contains(signerAlgos, algo) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is restricted for the provided signer", algo)
}
}
return &multiAlgorithmSigner{
AlgorithmSigner: signer,
supportedAlgorithms: algorithms,
}, nil
}
type multiAlgorithmSigner struct {
AlgorithmSigner
supportedAlgorithms []string
}
func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) Algorithms() []string {
return s.supportedAlgorithms
}
func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm string) bool {
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = underlyingAlgo(s.PublicKey().Type())
}
for _, algo := range s.supportedAlgorithms {
if algorithm == algo {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if !s.isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported: %v", algorithm, s.supportedAlgorithms)
}
return s.AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm)
}
type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string {
@@ -405,7 +488,49 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
h := hash.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob)
// Signatures in PKCS1v15 must match the key's modulus in
// length. However with SSH, some signers provide RSA
// signatures which are missing the MSB 0's of the bignum
// represented. With ssh-rsa signatures, this is encouraged by
// the spec (even though e.g. OpenSSH will give the full
// length unconditionally). With rsa-sha2-* signatures, the
// verifier is allowed to support these, even though they are
// out of spec. See RFC 4253 Section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and RFC
// 8332 Section 3 for rsa-sha2-* details.
//
// In practice:
// * OpenSSH always allows "short" signatures:
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L526
// but always generates padded signatures:
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L439
//
// * PuTTY versions 0.81 and earlier will generate short
// signatures for all RSA signature variants. Note that
// PuTTY is embedded in other software, such as WinSCP and
// FileZilla. At the time of writing, a patch has been
// applied to PuTTY to generate padded signatures for
// rsa-sha2-*, but not yet released:
// https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=a5bcf3d384e1bf15a51a6923c3724cbbee022d8e
//
// * SSH.NET versions 2024.0.0 and earlier will generate short
// signatures for all RSA signature variants, fixed in 2024.1.0:
// https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/releases/tag/2024.1.0
//
// As a result, we pad these up to the key size by inserting
// leading 0's.
//
// Note that support for short signatures with rsa-sha2-* may
// be removed in the future due to such signatures not being
// allowed by the spec.
blob := sig.Blob
keySize := (*rsa.PublicKey)(r).Size()
if len(blob) < keySize {
padded := make([]byte, keySize)
copy(padded[keySize-len(blob):], blob)
blob = padded
}
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, blob)
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
@@ -512,6 +637,10 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, k.PublicKey().Type())
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Algorithms() []string {
return []string{k.PublicKey().Type()}
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
@@ -817,6 +946,10 @@ func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify")
}
func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
return &k.PublicKey
}
type skEd25519PublicKey struct {
// application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH.
// see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details.
@@ -913,6 +1046,10 @@ func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return nil
}
func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey {
return k.PublicKey
}
// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey,
// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a
// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or
@@ -961,13 +1098,16 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, s.pubKey.Type())
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) Algorithms() []string {
return algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type())
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
}
supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type())
if !contains(supportedAlgos, algorithm) {
if !contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type())
}
@@ -1087,9 +1227,9 @@ func (*PassphraseMissingError) Error() string {
return "ssh: this private key is passphrase protected"
}
// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It
// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys. If the
// private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError.
// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It supports
// RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 private keys in PKCS#1, PKCS#8, OpenSSL, and OpenSSH
// formats. If the private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError.
func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) {
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if block == nil {
@@ -1142,16 +1282,27 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (interface{},
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err)
}
var result interface{}
switch block.Type {
case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf)
result, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf)
case "EC PRIVATE KEY":
return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf)
result, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf)
case "DSA PRIVATE KEY":
return ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf)
result, err = ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type)
err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type)
}
// Because of deficiencies in the format, DecryptPEMBlock does not always
// detect an incorrect password. In these cases decrypted DER bytes is
// random noise. If the parsing of the key returns an asn1.StructuralError
// we return x509.IncorrectPasswordError.
if _, ok := err.(asn1.StructuralError); ok {
return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError
}
return result, err
}
// ParseDSAPrivateKey returns a DSA private key from its ASN.1 DER encoding, as
@@ -1241,28 +1392,106 @@ func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc {
}
}
func unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) {
key := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, 8)
return key, "none", "none", "", nil
}
func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase []byte) openSSHEncryptFunc {
return func(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) {
salt := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return nil, "", "", "", err
}
opts := struct {
Salt []byte
Rounds uint32
}{salt, 16}
// Derive key to encrypt the private key block.
k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, salt, int(opts.Rounds), 32+aes.BlockSize)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", "", err
}
// Add padding matching the block size of AES.
keyBlock := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, aes.BlockSize)
// Encrypt the private key using the derived secret.
dst := make([]byte, len(keyBlock))
key, iv := k[:32], k[32:]
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", "", "", err
}
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
stream.XORKeyStream(dst, keyBlock)
return dst, "aes256-ctr", "bcrypt", string(Marshal(opts)), nil
}
}
const privateKeyAuthMagic = "openssh-key-v1\x00"
type openSSHDecryptFunc func(CipherName, KdfName, KdfOpts string, PrivKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error)
type openSSHEncryptFunc func(PrivKeyBlock []byte) (ProtectedKeyBlock []byte, cipherName, kdfName, kdfOptions string, err error)
type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct {
CipherName string
KdfName string
KdfOpts string
NumKeys uint32
PubKey []byte
PrivKeyBlock []byte
}
type openSSHPrivateKey struct {
Check1 uint32
Check2 uint32
Keytype string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type openSSHRSAPrivateKey struct {
N *big.Int
E *big.Int
D *big.Int
Iqmp *big.Int
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type openSSHEd25519PrivateKey struct {
Pub []byte
Priv []byte
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
type openSSHECDSAPrivateKey struct {
Curve string
Pub []byte
D *big.Int
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// parseOpenSSHPrivateKey parses an OpenSSH private key, using the decrypt
// function to unwrap the encrypted portion. unencryptedOpenSSHKey can be used
// as the decrypt function to parse an unencrypted private key. See
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key.
func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
const magic = "openssh-key-v1\x00"
if len(key) < len(magic) || string(key[:len(magic)]) != magic {
if len(key) < len(privateKeyAuthMagic) || string(key[:len(privateKeyAuthMagic)]) != privateKeyAuthMagic {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format")
}
remaining := key[len(magic):]
var w struct {
CipherName string
KdfName string
KdfOpts string
NumKeys uint32
PubKey []byte
PrivKeyBlock []byte
}
remaining := key[len(privateKeyAuthMagic):]
var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey
if err := Unmarshal(remaining, &w); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1284,13 +1513,7 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
return nil, err
}
pk1 := struct {
Check1 uint32
Check2 uint32
Keytype string
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{}
var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey
if err := Unmarshal(privKeyBlock, &pk1); err != nil || pk1.Check1 != pk1.Check2 {
if w.CipherName != "none" {
return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError
@@ -1300,18 +1523,7 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
switch pk1.Keytype {
case KeyAlgoRSA:
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/sshkey.c#L2760-L2773
key := struct {
N *big.Int
E *big.Int
D *big.Int
Iqmp *big.Int
P *big.Int
Q *big.Int
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{}
var key openSSHRSAPrivateKey
if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1337,13 +1549,7 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
return pk, nil
case KeyAlgoED25519:
key := struct {
Pub []byte
Priv []byte
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{}
var key openSSHEd25519PrivateKey
if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1360,14 +1566,7 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
copy(pk, key.Priv)
return &pk, nil
case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521:
key := struct {
Curve string
Pub []byte
D *big.Int
Comment string
Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{}
var key openSSHECDSAPrivateKey
if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1415,6 +1614,131 @@ func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.Priv
}
}
func marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, encrypt openSSHEncryptFunc) (*pem.Block, error) {
var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey
var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey
// Random check bytes.
var check uint32
if err := binary.Read(rand.Reader, binary.BigEndian, &check); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pk1.Check1 = check
pk1.Check2 = check
w.NumKeys = 1
// Use a []byte directly on ed25519 keys.
if k, ok := key.(*ed25519.PrivateKey); ok {
key = *k
}
switch k := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
E := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(k.PublicKey.E))
// Marshal public key:
// E and N are in reversed order in the public and private key.
pubKey := struct {
KeyType string
E *big.Int
N *big.Int
}{
KeyAlgoRSA,
E, k.PublicKey.N,
}
w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey)
// Marshal private key.
key := openSSHRSAPrivateKey{
N: k.PublicKey.N,
E: E,
D: k.D,
Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv,
P: k.Primes[0],
Q: k.Primes[1],
Comment: comment,
}
pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoRSA
pk1.Rest = Marshal(key)
case ed25519.PrivateKey:
pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)
priv := make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)
copy(pub, k[32:])
copy(priv, k)
// Marshal public key.
pubKey := struct {
KeyType string
Pub []byte
}{
KeyAlgoED25519, pub,
}
w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey)
// Marshal private key.
key := openSSHEd25519PrivateKey{
Pub: pub,
Priv: priv,
Comment: comment,
}
pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoED25519
pk1.Rest = Marshal(key)
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
var curve, keyType string
switch name := k.Curve.Params().Name; name {
case "P-256":
curve = "nistp256"
keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA256
case "P-384":
curve = "nistp384"
keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA384
case "P-521":
curve = "nistp521"
keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA521
default:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve " + name)
}
pub := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.PublicKey.X, k.PublicKey.Y)
// Marshal public key.
pubKey := struct {
KeyType string
Curve string
Pub []byte
}{
keyType, curve, pub,
}
w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey)
// Marshal private key.
key := openSSHECDSAPrivateKey{
Curve: curve,
Pub: pub,
D: k.D,
Comment: comment,
}
pk1.Keytype = keyType
pk1.Rest = Marshal(key)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", k)
}
var err error
// Add padding and encrypt the key if necessary.
w.PrivKeyBlock, w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, err = encrypt(Marshal(pk1))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
b := Marshal(w)
block := &pem.Block{
Type: "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY",
Bytes: append([]byte(privateKeyAuthMagic), b...),
}
return block, nil
}
func checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(pad []byte) error {
for i, b := range pad {
if int(b) != i+1 {
@@ -1424,6 +1748,13 @@ func checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(pad []byte) error {
return nil
}
func generateOpenSSHPadding(block []byte, blockSize int) []byte {
for i, l := 0, len(block); (l+i)%blockSize != 0; i++ {
block = append(block, byte(i+1))
}
return block
}
// FingerprintLegacyMD5 returns the user presentation of the key's
// fingerprint as described by RFC 4716 section 4.
func FingerprintLegacyMD5(pubKey PublicKey) string {

2
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func keyEq(a, b ssh.PublicKey) bool {
return bytes.Equal(a.Marshal(), b.Marshal())
}
// IsAuthorityForHost can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker
// IsHostAuthority can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker
func (db *hostKeyDB) IsHostAuthority(remote ssh.PublicKey, address string) bool {
h, p, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
if err != nil {

7
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"hash"
)
@@ -46,9 +47,15 @@ func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int {
func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() }
var macModes = map[string]*macMode{
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com": {64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha512.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha2-512": {64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha512.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}},

14
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -349,6 +349,20 @@ type userAuthGSSAPIError struct {
LanguageTag string
}
// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9
const msgPing = 192
type pingMsg struct {
Data string `sshtype:"192"`
}
// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9
const msgPong = 193
type pongMsg struct {
Data string `sshtype:"193"`
}
// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which
// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character.
func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) {

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ func (m *mux) onePacket() error {
return m.handleChannelOpen(packet)
case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure:
return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet)
case msgPing:
var msg pingMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal ping@openssh.com message: %w", err)
}
return m.sendMessage(pongMsg(msg))
}
// assume a channel packet.

263
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -64,6 +64,13 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
Config
// PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key
// authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate
// types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the
// client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
// If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used.
PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string
hostKeys []Signer
// NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without
@@ -201,9 +208,20 @@ func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewCha
if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 {
fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
}
if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 {
fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos
} else {
for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms {
if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo)
}
}
}
// Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges
for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges {
if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex)
}
}
@@ -321,7 +339,7 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
}
func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *connection,
func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection,
sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) {
gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server
defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext()
@@ -331,7 +349,7 @@ func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *c
outToken []byte
needContinue bool
)
outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(firstToken)
outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token)
if err != nil {
return err, nil, nil
}
@@ -353,6 +371,7 @@ func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *c
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token
}
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
@@ -370,6 +389,25 @@ func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *c
return authErr, perms, nil
}
// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the
// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old
// clients.
func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool {
// Compatibility for old clients.
//
// For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can
// be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm
// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com.
//
// With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512
// for signature format ssh-rsa.
if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) {
return true
}
// Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format.
return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat
}
// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
@@ -388,6 +426,35 @@ func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
// ServerAuthCallbacks defines server-side authentication callbacks.
type ServerAuthCallbacks struct {
// PasswordCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PasswordCallback].
PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
// PublicKeyCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback].
PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// KeyboardInteractiveCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback].
KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
// GSSAPIWithMICConfig behaves like [ServerConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig].
GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
}
// PartialSuccessError can be returned by any of the [ServerConfig]
// authentication callbacks to indicate to the client that authentication has
// partially succeeded, but further steps are required.
type PartialSuccessError struct {
// Next defines the authentication callbacks to apply to further steps. The
// available methods communicated to the client are based on the non-nil
// ServerAuthCallbacks fields.
Next ServerAuthCallbacks
}
func (p *PartialSuccessError) Error() string {
return "ssh: authenticated with partial success"
}
// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
@@ -395,14 +462,42 @@ func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn.
var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet")
// BannerError is an error that can be returned by authentication handlers in
// ServerConfig to send a banner message to the client.
type BannerError struct {
Err error
Message string
}
func (b *BannerError) Unwrap() error {
return b.Err
}
func (b *BannerError) Error() string {
if b.Err == nil {
return b.Message
}
return b.Err.Error()
}
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
var perms *Permissions
authFailures := 0
noneAuthCount := 0
var authErrs []error
var displayedBanner bool
partialSuccessReturned := false
// Set the initial authentication callbacks from the config. They can be
// changed if a PartialSuccessError is returned.
authConfig := ServerAuthCallbacks{
PasswordCallback: config.PasswordCallback,
PublicKeyCallback: config.PublicKeyCallback,
KeyboardInteractiveCallback: config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback,
GSSAPIWithMICConfig: config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig,
}
userAuthLoop:
for {
@@ -415,8 +510,8 @@ userAuthLoop:
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, discMsg
authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg)
return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
}
var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg
@@ -433,6 +528,11 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service)
}
if s.user != userAuthReq.User && partialSuccessReturned {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: client changed the user after a partial success authentication, previous user %q, current user %q",
s.user, userAuthReq.User)
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
@@ -453,20 +553,18 @@ userAuthLoop:
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
if config.NoClientAuth {
noneAuthCount++
// We don't allow none authentication after a partial success
// response.
if config.NoClientAuth && !partialSuccessReturned {
if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil {
perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s)
} else {
authErr = nil
}
}
// allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty
if authFailures == 0 {
authFailures--
}
case "password":
if config.PasswordCallback == nil {
if authConfig.PasswordCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured")
break
}
@@ -480,17 +578,17 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
perms, authErr = authConfig.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
break
}
prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s}
perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
perms, authErr = authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
case "publickey":
if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured")
break
}
@@ -505,7 +603,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
algo := string(algoBytes)
if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo)
break
}
@@ -524,11 +622,18 @@ userAuthLoop:
if !ok {
candidate.user = s.user
candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
candidate.result = checkSourceAddress(
candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) &&
candidate.perms != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil &&
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
if err := checkSourceAddress(
s.RemoteAddr(),
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption])
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]); err != nil {
candidate.result = err
}
}
cache.add(candidate)
}
@@ -540,8 +645,8 @@ userAuthLoop:
if len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
if candidate.result == nil {
_, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError)
if candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError {
okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{
Algo: algo,
PubKey: pubKeyData,
@@ -557,17 +662,26 @@ userAuthLoop:
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
// Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the
// decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g.
// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public
// key type. The algorithm and public key type must be
// consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither.
if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q",
pubKey.Type(), algo)
break
}
// Ensure the public key algo and signature algo
// are supported. Compare the private key
// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
// for certs, the names differ.
if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, sig.Format) {
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
break
}
if underlyingAlgo(algo) != sig.Format {
if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo)
break
}
@@ -582,11 +696,11 @@ userAuthLoop:
perms = candidate.perms
}
case "gssapi-with-mic":
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured")
break
}
gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
gssapiConfig := authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
@@ -638,53 +752,86 @@ userAuthLoop:
config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr)
}
var bannerErr *BannerError
if errors.As(authErr, &bannerErr) {
if bannerErr.Message != "" {
bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
Message: bannerErr.Message,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
if authErr == nil {
break userAuthLoop
}
authFailures++
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok {
// After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user
// name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback.
partialSuccessReturned = true
// In case a partial success is returned, the server may send
// a new set of authentication methods.
authConfig = partialSuccess.Next
// Reset pubkey cache, as the new PublicKeyCallback might
// accept a different set of public keys.
cache = pubKeyCache{}
// Send back a partial success message to the user.
failureMsg.PartialSuccess = true
} else {
// Allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty.
if authFailures > 0 || userAuthReq.Method != "none" || noneAuthCount != 1 {
authFailures++
}
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authentication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
}
}
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if config.PasswordCallback != nil {
if authConfig.PasswordCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password")
}
if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey")
}
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
}
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
}
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods available")
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {

35
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
package ssh
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -332,6 +333,40 @@ func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr {
return l.laddr
}
// DialContext initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host.
//
// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before the
// connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully connected,
// any expiration of the context will not affect the connection.
//
// See func Dial for additional information.
func (c *Client) DialContext(ctx context.Context, n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
type connErr struct {
conn net.Conn
err error
}
ch := make(chan connErr)
go func() {
conn, err := c.Dial(n, addr)
select {
case ch <- connErr{conn, err}:
case <-ctx.Done():
if conn != nil {
conn.Close()
}
}
}()
select {
case res := <-ch:
return res.conn, res.err
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host.
// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr().
func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {

35
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go generated vendored
View File

@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ import (
const debugTransport = false
const (
gcmCipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
gcm128CipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
gcm256CipherID = "aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc"
tripledescbcID = "3des-cbc"
)
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ type transport struct {
rand io.Reader
isClient bool
io.Closer
strictMode bool
initialKEXDone bool
}
// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC
@@ -73,6 +77,18 @@ type connectionState struct {
pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher
}
func (t *transport) setStrictMode() error {
if t.reader.seqNum != 1 {
return errors.New("ssh: sequence number != 1 when strict KEX mode requested")
}
t.strictMode = true
return nil
}
func (t *transport) setInitialKEXDone() {
t.initialKEXDone = true
}
// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet
// respectively.
@@ -111,11 +127,12 @@ func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
// Read and decrypt next packet.
func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
for {
p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader)
p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader, t.strictMode)
if err != nil {
break
}
if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
// in strict mode we pass through DEBUG and IGNORE packets only during the initial KEX
if len(p) == 0 || (t.strictMode && !t.initialKEXDone) || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
break
}
}
@@ -126,7 +143,7 @@ func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
return p, err
}
func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader, strictMode bool) ([]byte, error) {
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r)
s.seqNum++
if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 {
@@ -139,6 +156,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
if strictMode {
s.seqNum = 0
}
default:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message")
}
@@ -169,10 +189,10 @@ func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
if debugTransport {
t.printPacket(packet, true)
}
return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet)
return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet, t.strictMode)
}
func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte, strictMode bool) error {
changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys
err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet)
@@ -187,6 +207,9 @@ func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
if strictMode {
s.seqNum = 0
}
default:
panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys")
}